No. 10-13-00109-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT WACO

Michael Anthony McGruder
Appellant

v.

The State of Texas
Appellee

On Appeal from the 85th District Court of Travis County, in Cause No. 11-05822-CRF-85 , the Honorable Mike Lynch, Judge Presiding

Brief for the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association as *Amicus Curiae* Supporting Appellant

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Identity of Parties and Counsel

Pursuant to Rule 38.1(a), Rules of Appellate Procedure ("Tex.R.App.Pro."), the following is a complete list of the names and addresses of all parties to the trial court's final judgment and their counsel in the trial court, as well as appellate counsel, so the members of the Court may at once determine whether they are disqualified to serve or should recuse themselves from participating in the decision of the case and so the Clerk of the Court may properly notify the parties to the trial court's final judgment or their counsel, if any, of the judgment and all orders of the Court of Appeals.

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Statement of the Case

The parties have adequately stated the nature of the case.

Issues Presented

Whether, by purporting to authorize a "mandatory" blood draw, without the need to demonstrate exigent circumstances or obtain a search warrant, Transportation Code section 724.012(b)(3)(B), is unconstitutional.

Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream alone constitutes a sufficient exigency for a warrantless blood draw.

Statement Pursuant to Rule 11, Tex.R.App.Pro.

The Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association ("TCDLA") is the largest state association for criminal defense attorneys in the nation. TCDLA started more than 40 years ago as a small, nonprofit association and has grown into a state-of-the-art organization, providing assistance, support and continuing education to its members. TCDLA provides a statewide forum for criminal defense lawyers and is the only voice in the legislature interested in basic fairness in criminal defense cases.

This brief complies with all applicable provisions of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and copies have been served on all parties listed above.

Neither TCDLA nor any of the attorneys representing TCDLA have received any fee or other compensation for preparing this brief.

No. 10-13-00109-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT WACO

Michael Anthony McGruder
Appellant

v.

The State of Texas
Appellee

On Appeal from the 85th District Court of Brazos County, in Cause No. 11-05822-CRF-85 , the Honorable J. D. Langley, Judge Presiding

Brief for the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association as *Amicus Curiae* Supporting Appellant

TO THE HONORABLE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS:

COMES NOW, the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, *Amicus Curae*, respectfully submits this *amicus curiae* brief supporting Appellant, and would show the Court as follows:

Facts of the Case

In the early morning hours of September 27, 2011, Officer Jay Summers, of the College Station Police Department was on patrol duty (RR Vol. 2, PP. 25, 46). Shortly after midnight, there was a dispatch concerning a black male, described as being heavy set, wearing gray shorts and driving a red truck with a lot of junk in the back of it, who had frightened someone in the parking lot of the University Place Condominiums (RR Vol. 2, P. 25).

After he finished his previous call, Summers saw the red truck, with junk in the back, pass by him (RR Vol. 2. P. 28). He pulled in behind the truck; it continued a short period of time before parking in the Southgate Village apartment complex (RR Vol. 2, P. 29). Because of the earlier suspicious person call, Summers wanted to investigate why Appellant was over at the University Place Condominiums (RR Vol. 2, P. 35). Summers noted that Appellant smelled of alcohol (RR Vol. 2, P. 36).

Because Summers was not the primary officer, he called Officer Paris to complete his investigation, then listened to Paris' interview of Appellant (RR Vol. 2, P. 38). Although Summers was seven to ten feet away, he continued to smell alcohol, coming from Appellant, while Appellant was being interviewed by Paris (RR Vol. 2, P. 39). The initial dispatch was around 12:19 a.m. (RR Vol. 2, P. 25). At approximately 12:32 a.m., Appellant refused Officer Paris' request to perform field sobriety tests (RR Vol. 2, P. 38). After the investigation was complete, Appellant was arrested (R Vol. 2, P. 44).

Once Appellant's truck, which had been impounded, was inventoried and the wrecker took possession of it, Paris transported Appellant to the police department to write a search warrant for his blood (RR Vol. 2, P. 90). Once Paris learned that Appellant had two prior convictions for driving while intoxicated, however, he stopped preparing the search warrant, filled out the mandatory blood draw form and obtained a blood draw kit (RR Vol. 2, P. 91). Paris testified that he

abandoned obtaining the search warrant for blood because it takes time to get a warrant and "every bit of time matters because his body is eliminating the alcohol that's in his system" (RR Vol. 2, P. 91).

Issue as Framed by *Amicus Curae*

TCDLA proposes a three pronged analysis for use in all mandatory blood draw cases. First, that implied consent alone is insufficient; second, that no "implied consent" statute can trump the 4th Amendment; and third, even when the State is entitled to draw blood under an implied consent statute, its agents must first seek a warrant, unless there is a *bona fide* exigency.

Arguments & Authorities

I

McNeely Recognizes the Need for More than Implied Consent

The officer's whose actions were at issue in ***Missouri v. McNeely***, 569 U. S. _____ (No. 11-1425; April 17, 2013), was acting pursuant to sections 577.020.1, and 577.041, of the Missouri Annotated Statutes. ***McNeely***, slip op. at 2.

> While on highway patrol at approximately 2:08 a.m., a Missouri police officer stopped Tyler McNeely's truck after observing it exceed the posted speed limit and repeatedly cross the centerline. The officer noticed several signs that McNeely was intoxicated, including McNeely's bloodshot eyes, his slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol on his breath. McNeely acknowledged to the officer that he had consumed "a couple of beers" at a bar, App. 20, and he appeared unsteady on his feet when he exited the truck. After McNeely performed poorly on a battery of field-sobriety tests and declined to use a portable breath-test device to measure his blood alcohol concentration (BAC), the officer placed him under arrest.

> The officer began to transport McNeely to the station house. But when McNeely indicated that he would again refuse to provide a breath sample, the officer changed course and took McNeely to a nearby hospital for blood testing. The officer did not attempt to secure a warrant. Upon arrival at the hospital, the officer asked McNeely whether he would consent to a blood test. Reading from a standard implied consent form, the officer explained to McNeely that under state law refusal to submit voluntarily to the test would lead to the immediate revocation of his driver's license for one year and could be used against him in a future prosecution. See Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 577.020.1, 577.041 (West 2011). McNeely nonetheless refused. The officer then directed a hospital lab technician to take a blood sample, and the sample was secured at approximately 2:35 a.m. Subsequent laboratory testing measured McNeely's BAC at 0.154 percent, which was well above the legal limit of 0.08 percent. See § 577.012.1.

Under any definition, the officer had probable cause to arrest Mr. McNeely and, under Missouri's implied consent law, was entitled to his blood. The question in ***McNeely***, therefore, was only whether there were exigent circumstances which would vitiate the warrant requirement. The ***McNealy*** Court's resolution of the matter makes it clear that the dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream alone does not create exigent circumstances.

> It suffices to say that the metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream and the ensuing loss of evidence are among the factors that must be considered in deciding whether a warrant is required. No doubt, given the large number of arrests for this offense in different jurisdictions nationwide, cases will arise when anticipated delays in obtaining a warrant will justify a blood test without judicial authorization, for in every case the law must be concerned that evidence is being destroyed.

McNeely, slip op. at 23.

II

A Statute Cannot Trump the 4th Amendment

In ***Sibron v. New York***, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the Supreme Court considered New York's "stop-and-frisk" law, N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a, which the New York Court of Appeals apparently viewed as authorizing a particular search. The Court wrote that,

> Section 180-a, unlike § 813-a, deals with the substantive validity of certain types of seizures and searches without warrants. It purports to authorize police officers to "stop" people, "demand" explanations of them and "search [them] for dangerous weapon[s]" in certain circumstances upon "reasonable suspicion" that they are engaged in criminal activity and that they represent a danger to the policeman. The operative categories of § 180-a are not the categories of the Fourth Amendment, and they are susceptible of a wide variety of interpretations.[fn20] New York is, of course, free to develop its own law of search and seizure to meet the needs of local law enforcement, see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963), and in the process it may call the standards it employs by any names it may choose. It may not, however, authorize police conduct which trenches upon Fourth Amendment rights, regardless of the labels which it attaches to such conduct. The question in this Court upon review of a state-approved search or seizure "is not whether the search [or seizure] was authorized by state law. The question is rather whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Just as a search authorized by state law may be an unreasonable one under that amendment, so may a search not expressly authorized by state law be justified as a constitutionally reasonable one." Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967).

Sibron, 392 U.S. at 61 (footnote omitted). This was, in fact, the holding in ***State v. Villarreal***. _____ S.W.3d _____ (Tex.App. - Corpus Christi No. 13-13-00253-CR; January 23, 2014).

> The officer's sole basis for not getting a warrant was that the repeat offender provision of the mandatory blood draw law required him to take a blood sample without Appellee's consent and without the necessity of obtaining a search warrant. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012(b)(3)(B). Although we agree that the statute required the

> officer to obtain a breath or blood sample, it did not require the officer to do so without first obtaining a warrant. See id.
>
> * * *
>
> To date, neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized the repeat offender provision of the mandatory blood draw law as a new exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement separate and apart from the consent exception and the exception for exigent circumstances.[fn11] In fact, in Beeman, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that these laws do not give police officers anything "more than [what] the Constitution already gives them." Beeman, 86 S.W.3d at 616. Accordingly, we conclude that the constitutionality of the repeat offender provision of the mandatory blood draw law must be based on the previously recognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.[fn12]

Villarreal, slip op. at 20-21 (footnotes omitted). Additionally, there is no way to read the Supreme Court's summary remand of ***Aviles v. Texas***, _____ U.S. _____ (No. 13-6353; January 13, 2014), other than as a statement, certainly implied, that no statute trumps the 4th Amendment.

Thus, in light of ***McNeely*** and ***Aviles***, it is clear that no "implied consent" mandatory blood draw provision will dispense with the warrant requirement of the 4th Amendment. Even if an officer is entitled to obtain the blood of someone he or she has arrested, they must first at least try to obtain a search warrant.

Additionally, where the State seeks to use a warrantless blood draw based on probable cause and implied consent, it has the burden of demonstrating exigent circumstances. As part of this burden, the State must demonstrate why no warrant was possible.

III

Given the Ease of Locating a Magistrate with Modern Technology, The State Must At Least Try to Obtain A Search Warrant

In ***McNeely***, the Supreme Court's recent landmark case, the Court discussed the application of technology to the practice of law, observing that technology now "allow[s] for the more expeditious processing of warrant applications." The Court cited state statutes permitting warrants to be obtained "remotely through various means, including telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication . . ., and video conferencing." The Court stated,

> The State's proposed per se rule also fails to account for advances in the 47 years since Schmerber was decided that allow for the more expeditious processing of warrant applications, particularly in contexts like drunk-driving investigations where the evidence offered to establish probable cause is simple. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended in 1977 to permit federal magistrate judges to issue a warrant based on sworn testimony communicated by telephone. See 91 Stat. 319. As amended, the law now allows a federal magistrate judge to consider "information communicated by telephone or other reliable electronic means." Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 4.1. States have also innovated. Well over a majority of States allow police officers or prosecutors to apply for search warrants remotely through various means, including telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication such as e-mail, and video conferencing.[fn4] And in addition to technology-based developments, jurisdictions have found other ways to streamline the warrant process, such as by using standard-form warrant applications for drunk-driving investigations.[fn5]

McNeely, slip op. at 10-12 (footnotes omitted). In Texas, in fact, obtaining warrants without having to meet a magistrate face-to-face is well accepted in law enforcement circles. See ***Clay v. State***, 382 S.W.3d 465 (Tex.App. - Waco 2012), in which this Court held that a face-to-face

meeting between the trooper and the judge was not required and the making of the oath over the telephone did not invalidate the search warrant.

Application of the Law to the Facts of the Case

The State did not obtain a warrant for Appellant's blood, and the officer involved never even tried. In fact, his testimony at trial demonstrated that the arresting officer intended to request a search warrant for Appellant's blood, and was in the process of completing a search warrant application/affidavit, but abandoned that attempt once he learned Appellant had two prior convictions for driving while intoxicated. Consequently, there has been no showing that there was any attempt to reach a magistrate and no evidence that there would have been any difficulty in obtaining a warrant, or that the arresting officer did not have cell phone numbers, etc., for the local magistrates. The State had the burden in the trial court and at the Court of Appeals, yet failed to introduce any information about efforts in this case to reach one of the local magistrates.

Conclusion

The State neither made nor attempted to make a showing of exigent circumstances and did not seek a search warrant. Consequently, the trial court erred when it overruled Appellant's objections to the blood draw evidence.

Prayer

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, *amicus curiae* in the above styled and numbered cause respectfully prays that, for the reasons set out herein, the Court will reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted:

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

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This is to certify that: (1) this document, created using WordPerfect™ X7 software, contains 2335 words, excluding those items permitted by Rule 9.4 (i)(1), Tex.R.App.Pro., and complies with Rules 9.4 (i)(2)(B) and 9.4 (i)(3), Tex.R.App.Pro.; and (2) on April 4, 2014, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing "Brief for the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association as *Amicus Curiae* Supporting Appellant" was transmitted electronic mail (*eMail*) to Douglas Howell III (dhowell@co.brazos.tx.us), counsel of record for the State of Texas.

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