*Note: the cases cited herein are followed by full citations regardless of whether they have been cited previously.  This was done in order to prevent inadvertent deletions of the full citation should you choose to delete some of the arguments or paragraphs.

CAUSE NO. _________

THE STATE OF TEXAS            		*			 IN THE ___________

VS.                           				*		  		COURT OF

_________________________     		*    __________________ COUNTY, TEXAS

MOTION TO LIMIT JURY ARGUMENT OF STATE

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

	Now comes, _____________________, Defendant herein, and files this Motion to Limit Jury Argument of State, and for cause would show the Court as follows:
I.
	There are four permissible areas of jury argument for the State:

a.	A summary of the evidence;

b.	Discussion of reasonable deductions from the evidence;
c.	Response to arguments of Defense counsel; and
d.	A proper plea for law enforcement.
Walker v. State, 664 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).   The Court should order the State to confine its summation to those areas and to refrain from any mention whatsoever of the various arguments, set forth below, which have caused appellate courts to reverse convictions.

II.
COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS
	That the Prosecutor not argue that the people of the community want or expect a conviction, that there is community pressure or sentiment to convict, or that the jury verdict may or may not meet with public approval.  Prohibited argument includes, but is not limited to, the following:

a.	That the people are asking the jury to convict the Defendant.  Cox v. State, 247 S.W.2d 262, 263-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1951);

b.	That the community would want the Defendant sent to prison if the people knew what he had done.  White v. State, 699 S.W.2d 607, 611 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, pet. ref’d) (citing Prado v. State, 626 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982));

c.	That any particular punishment is required to satisfy the community.  Cortez v. State, 683 S.W.2d 419, 420-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984);

d.	Urging the jury to convict or return a verdict of death in order to solve a social problem;

e.	Any argument that diverts the jurors from their correct task which is the determination of the proper sentence for the defendant before them, based upon his own past conduct;

f.	Inquiring of the jury as to whether or not it has the “intestinal fortitude” to do its “legal  duty” or using similar language that would suggest that the jury has a duty to return any  particular verdict or that returning a guilty verdict or sentence of death was doing “its job”;

g.	Any argument that is intended to appeal to a jury’s partiality;

h.	Commenting on the defendant’s future dangerousness at guilt phase where evidence against the defendant is not strong. Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. N. Mar. I. 1992), overruled by George v. Camacho, 119 F.3d 1393, 1395 (overruling Mendiola on other grounds);

i.	Arguing that the community or any particular segment of the community expects or demands either a guilty verdict or a particular punishment. Borjan v. State, 787 S.W.2d 53, 55-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990);

j.	Asking the jury "do you honestly think that Judge Poe really wants these guys on probation?" Harris v. State, 56 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.], 2001);

k.	Any argument that is contrary to the law as charged or speculating as to what should the law be or what the law should be in the future;

l.	Specifically in a capital case where the jury instructed that the defendant will serve 40 years before he/she is eligible for parole, the prosecutor should be precluded from telling, implying or suggesting to the jury anything to the effect of  “.. you can never tell what a  future legislature will do.” This line of argument encourages the jurors to disregard the Court’s instructions and to violate the oath that the Court has given them as jurors and which each of them has sworn to uphold.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.22  requires that each juror,  “a true verdict render according to the law and the evidence so help you God.”  (emphasis added).

III.
PERSONAL OPINION AND VOUCHING FOR CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES OR 
STATE'S CASE
	That the Prosecutor not express a personal opinion regarding the credibility of the witnesses, the strength of the evidence, the guilt of the Defendant or the appropriate punishment.  Prohibited argument includes, but is not limited to, the following:

a.	That the Prosecutor believes that the Defendant is guilty. Villalobos v. State, 568 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978);

b.	That the Prosecutor is not paid enough to try to convict an innocent man.  Elizondo v. State, 545 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976);

c.	That the Prosecutor does not introduce evidence unless he believes it is true.  Robillard v. State, 641 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982);

d.	That the Prosecutor would not prosecute the Defendant unless the State's witnesses were telling the truth and the Defendant was guilty.  Hickerson v. State, 286 S.W.2d 437, 438-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956);

e.	That the Prosecutor has personal knowledge regarding the credibility of the witnesses.  Tinker v. State, 93 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 1936);

f.	That the Prosecutor believes that any particular witness was honest or truthful.  Menefee v. State, 614 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Morris v. State, 755 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d).

g.	That police officers are entitled to greater belief than the Defendant because the Defendant has an interest in acquittal, whereas the officers are impartial and only arrest people whom they believe have committed an offense.  Caka v. State, 302 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957);

h.	That because the jurors are paying the police officers through their taxes and because the city has retained the officers on the payroll that the city must have confidence in their honesty and integrity.  Stearn v. State, 487 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (citing Woodard v. State, 368 S.W.2d 623 ( Tex. Crim. App. 1963));

i.	That police officers are sworn to tell the truth, and did tell the truth.  Puckett v. State, 330 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959);

j.	That the race, creed or color of any witness should be a factor in assessing his credibility. Larkin v. State, 248 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950); Arnold v. State, 256 S.W. 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 1923).

IV.
IMPROPER REFERENCES TO THE DEFENDANT
	That the Prosecutor not refer to the Defendant by any name other than his given name or nickname, nor by any generic term designed to subject the Defendant to personal abuse or suggest that the is "less than human."  Prohibited argument includes, but is not limited to, the following:

a.	References to heinous, infamous criminals such as John Dillinger, Clyde Barrow, Lee Harvey Oswald, Jeffrey Dahmer, Ted Bundy, John Wayne Gacy, or any other well known criminal.  Rehm v. State, 78 S.W.2d 983 (Tex. Crim. App. 1935); Lee v. State, 97 S.W.2d 697, (Tex. Crim. App. 1936); Stell v. State, 711 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986, no pet.); Brown v. State, 978 S.W.2d 708, 713-714 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. ref’d);

b.	Derogatory references such as, but not limited to:

i.	"cowardly cur."  Jupe v. State, 217 S.W. 1041 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920);

ii.	"fiend from hell."  McGrew v. State, 143 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940);

iii.	"beast." Marx v. State, 150 S.W.2d 1014 (Tex. Crim. App. 1941);

iv.	"punk."  Duran v. State, 356 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962);

v.	"hippie, anti-Christ and Communist."  Renn v. State, 495 S.W.2d 922, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), overruled by Burrell v. State, 526 S.W.2d 799, 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (overruling Renn on other grounds);

vi.	“a thug, a thief and a vagrant.”  Martinez v. State, 332 S.W.2d 718, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960);

vii.	“heathen, animal,” or references to the Defendant's race.  Richardson v. State, 257 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1953);

viii.	“Hitler” or “Nazi”; State v. Frink, 158 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003);

ix.	“liar”; State v. Gell 351 N.C. 192, 211 (2000);

x.	“Son of a bitch” (or implying that the defendant was not raised by his mother); State v. Frink, 158 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003);

xi.	“this quitter, this loser, this worthless piece of. . . . He’s as mean as they come. He’s lower than the dirt of a snake’s belly.”  State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117 (2002);

xii.	“professional crooks”; State v. Foster, 162 S.E.2d 583 (N.C. Ct. App. 1968);

c.	Any reference to African-Americans as “bad people” and calling attention to fact that the defendant is not a local  United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996).

V.
OTHER ACTS OF MISCONDUCT BY DEFENDANT
	That the Prosecutor not suggest or infer that the Defendant has committed any offense or act of misconduct not in evidence.  Prohibited argument includes, but is not limited to, the following:
a.	There is a reasonable deduction that the Defendant has previously been arrested or jailed.  Lookabaugh v. State, 352 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961);

b.	That the Defendant earns his livelihood committing the type of offense for which he is on trial.  Walker v. State, 664 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984);

c.	That the evidence raised the inference that the Defendant has committed other crimes similar to the offense on trial.  Melton v. State, 713 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Rodriquez v. State, 520 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975);

d.	That the State is limited in its ability to introduce evidence regarding the Defendant's background, prior criminal record, juvenile record, or other offenses or acts of misconduct.  Parson v. State, 652 S.W.2d 616 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1983, no pet.); Everett v. State, 707 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986);

e.	That the Prosecutor was prohibited from inquiring about extraneous offenses committed by the Defendant, and was thus limited to asking the State's witnesses the only questions allowed by law.  Robinson v. State, 701 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).

VI.
FAILURE OF THE DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY
	That the Prosecutor not comment, directly, or indirectly, on the Defendant's failure to testify at either stage of the trial.   Prohibited argument includes, but is not limited to, the following;

a.	That the motive for the offense has not been revealed because the only person who knows the motive (referring to the Defendant) did not offer one.  Koller v. State, 518 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Lee v. State, 628 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982);

b.	That it has not been contested that the Defendant committed the offense.  Angel v. State 627 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982);

c.	That there has been no explanation for the offenses.  Myers v. State, 573 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978, pet ref’d);

d.	Where only the perpetrator was in a position to rebut the State's witness or witnesses, that the State's evidence was uncontradicted or that the Defense had presented no evidence to challenge the credibility of a State's witness. Dubose v. State, 531 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Pollard v. State, 552 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977);

e.	That the Prosecutor not refer to or gesture at the Defendant and argue, ". . there is somebody that we haven’t heard from in this case. And I think you all know who it is," or words to that effect.  Hicks v. State, 525 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975);  Thompson v. State, 651 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983);

f.	That the Prosecutor not ask rhetorical questions of the Defendant under the guise of argument.  Bird v. State, 527 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975);

g.	That the Prosecutor not refer to the Defendant's failure to raise any particular defense, followed by references in the first person to the manner in which the Defendant would have articulated that defense.  Cherry v. State, 507 S.W.2d 549, (Tex. Crim. App. 1974);  Cook v. State, 702 S.W.2d 597, (Tex. Crim. App. 1984);

h.	That the Defendant has not apologized, expressed remorse, or explanation.  Koller v. State, 518 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Anderson v. State, 525 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975);  Johnson v. State, 611 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981);  Elkins v. State, 647 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983);  Dickinson v. State, 685 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984);

i.	That the Defendant no one was present except the sherrif and the Defendant, and the Defedant did not have to testify. Bomar v. State, 56 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 1933);

j.	That the Defendant had not contradicted the sale of contraband. Wood v. State, 28 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Crim. App. 1930);

k.	That no one denied that match of tire tracks and shoeprints at the crime scene and because the Defendant allegedly acted alone, this amounted to an inference that Defendant’s refusal to take the stand equated to guilt. Traylor v. State, 11 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1928);

l.	That the Prosecutor’s repeated commentary on Defendant’s failure to testify at the scene of the crime and at trial was a violation of Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art 38.08 and mandated a mistrial. Shepherd v. State, 915 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ ref’d). 

VII.
IMPROPER REASONS TO CONVICT
	That the Prosecutor not argue that the Defendant should be convicted for any reason other than that the evidence has established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Prohibited argument includes, but is not limited to, the following:

a.	That the Defendant should be convicted because of the rising cost of crime or that conviction would solve any other social ill. Bridewell v. State, 114 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938);

b.	That the Defendant can appeal a conviction but the State cannot appeal an acquittal.  Stone v. State, 751 S.W.2d 579, 586-87 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d), overruled by Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (overruled on other grounds);

c.	That any mistake made would be corrected by an appellate court.  Borgen v. State, 682 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no pet.);

d.	That the Defendant would not have hired an attorney unless he was guilty.  United States v. McDonald, 620 F.2d 559, 564 (5th Cir. 1980);

e.	That if found not guilty, the Defendant will continue to engage in criminal behavior. Morris v. State, 755 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd.);

f.	That the jury must “send a message” to the community by their verdict.  This is contrary to the oath of a juror that requires each of them to render a true verdict according to the law and the evidence.”  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.22;

g.	Any argument that leads the jurors away from the evidence by appealing to a sense of passion and prejudice. State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117 (2002).

VIII.
CRITICISM OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
	That the Prosecutor neither argue that Defense counsel is subject to criticism for representing persons accused of crime nor criticize counsel's conduct or ethics.  Prohibited argument includes, but is not limited to, the following:

a.	That Defense counsel is a mouthpiece for criminals whereas the prosecutor is a public servant paid to represent the people of the community.  Dykes v. State, 325 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959);

b.	That the Prosecutor is grateful that he represents the people of the community and does not have to make a living representing criminal Defendants.  Bray v. State, 478 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972);

c.	That the Prosecutor took an oath to seek justice, but no such oath bears on Defense counsel.  Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975);

d.	That Defense counsel's duty is to get the Defendant off, even if counsel has to put on witnesses to lie.  Bell v. State, 614 S.W.2d 122, (Tex. Crim. App. 1981);

e.	Asking the jury whether, assuming Defendant is guilty, they believe that Defense counsel wants the truth before the jury.  Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975);

f.	References to any other criminal cases handled by Defense counsel.  Summers v. State, 182 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944);

g.	That Defense counsel has manufactured or destroyed evidence or is capable of doing so.  Jones v. State, 205 S.W.2d 590, 592-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1947); Gomez v. State, 704 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Sunday v. State, 745 S.W.2d 436, 440 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1988, pet. ref'd.);

h.	That Defense counsel and the Defendant lied in entering a plea of not guilty.  Lopez v. State, 500 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973);

i.	That Defense counsel was willing to or did lie to or “pull the wool over the eyes of” the jury.  Anderson v. State, 525 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975);  Everett v. State, 707 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986);

j.	That Defense counsel did not argue that the Defendant was innocent.  Anderson v. State, 525 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975);

k.	References to or derogatory comments concerning Defense counsel's strategy,  courtroom tactics or ethics, such as suggesting that counsel is shrewd, tricky or acting in bad faith.  Jones v. State, 205 S.W.2d 590, 592-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1947);  Cook v. State, 537 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976);  Fuentes v. State, 664 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984);  Lopez v. State, 705 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, no pet.); Mosby v. State, 2003, Tex. App. LEXIS 2963, 13 (“You know during cross-examination defense counsel played this tape but just glazed over certain parts of that tape, certain parts that they didn't want you to hear. They didn't want you to focus on.”);

l.	Reference to the fact that Defense counsel made objections during the trial.  Garza v. State, 160 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942); Anderson v. State, 525 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Fuentes v. State, 664 S.W.2d 333, 336-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984);

m.	That as long as lawyers are for hire, justice is for sale.  Borgen v. State, 672 S.W.2d 456, 457-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984);

n.	References to defense as “phony,”  Blazak v. Ricketts, 971 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1992);

o.	stating"[defense counsel] wishes . . . that you turn a guilty man free . . . because he doesn't have the obligation to see that justice is done"  Wilson v. State, 938 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996);

p.	indicating that the defense counsel wanted the jury to "take a side road, a series of side roads, rabbit trails, and a rabbit trail that will lead . . . to a dead-end." Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

IX.
COURT PROCEEDINGS
	That the Prosecutor not comment on rulings of the Court or the Defendant's non-testimonial demeanor.  Prohibited argument includes, but is not limited to, the following:

a.	That the State could not introduce certain evidence due to the Defendant's objections.  Lopez v. State, 705 S.W.2d 296, 297-98 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, no pet.);

b.	That the Court's inclusion in the jury charge of a defensive theory or lesser included offense  does not mean that the Court believes it.  McClory v. State, 510 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974);  Dunbar v. State, 551 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977);

c.	Reference to the Defendant's non-testimonial demeanor in the courtroom.  Reynolds v. State, 505 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Good v. State, 723 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

X.
ARGUING THE LAW IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO COURT'S CHARGE
	That the Prosecutor not argue the law in a manner contrary to the Court's charge.  Prohibited argument includes, but is not limited to, the following;

a.	Any statement of substantive law that is not contained in or is contrary to law or to the Court's charge.  Davis v. State, 506 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974);  Burke v. State, 652 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Renteria v. State, 977 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Peak v. State, 57 S.W.3d 14 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.);

b.	That evidence admitted for a limited purpose be considered for any other purpose. Sanchez v. State, 591 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979);

c.	That hearsay can be considered for the truth of the matter asserted. Girard v. State, 631 S.W.2d 162, 164-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (overruled on other grounds).

XI.
DRUG CASES
	That the Prosecutor not argue about the impact of drugs on the community in any manner not supported by the evidence.  Prohibited argument includes, but is not limited to, the following:

a.	That the quantity of drugs possessed was enough to keep someone high for a specified period of time.  Turrentine v. State, 536 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976);
b.	That on the basis of the quantity of drugs possessed, the Defendant was probably selling drugs.  Turrentine v. State, 536 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976);
c.	That drug users also sell drugs.  Hemmeline v. State, 314 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958);
d.	That the jurors, as citizens, are in some manner responsible for the drug problem in the community. Morris v. State, 755 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd.);
e.	That any particular percentage of crime in the community is attributable to drugs.  White v. State, 492 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); 
f.	That the number of drug dealers in the community would fill any particular location. Morris v. State, 755 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd.); 
g.	That the Defendant's conduct has adversely affected others in the community. Rodriquez v. State, 520 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Thomas v. State, 527 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975);  
h.	That Defendant's involvement with drugs is responsible for numerous crimes committed by others to obtain money for drugs.  Person v. State, 706 S.W.2d 153, 155-56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.);

i.	That the Defendant is responsible for the drug problem among young people. Morris v. State, 755 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd.).

XII.
VICTIM OR WITNESS MOTIVES FOR TESTIFYING OR FAILURE TO TESTIFY
That the Prosecutor not argue or imply that the Defendant has anything to do with a witness or victim’s failure to testify or motive for testifying. Prohibited argument includes, but is not limited to, the following:

a.	That the complaining witness is not asking for a conviction because he/she is afraid of the Defendant.  Chambliss v. State, 200 S.W.2d 1003 (Tex. Crim. App. 1947);

b.	That absent witnesses are afraid to testify or have been “frightened from the courtroom” by the Defendant.  Person v. State, 706 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986, no pet.); Johnson v. State, 662 S.W.2d 368, 369-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Thomas v. State, 519 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975);

c.	That the Defendant did not call certain witnesses because he is afraid that they will incriminate him.  Clary v. State, 140 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940);

d.	That the Defendant has been “courting” the witnesses in order to gain favorable testimony. Clary v. State, 140 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940);

e.	Inviting the jury to speculate as to why co-defendants were not called by the Defendant to testify, and on what the co-defendant’s testimony might have been.  Berryhill v. State, 501 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).

XIII.
SYMPATHY FOR THE VICTIM’S FAMILY
	That the Prosecutor refrain from making improper pleas for sympathy and from speculating on the future plight of the victim’s children or family members.  Prohibited argument includes, but is not limited to, the following:

a.	That the victim’s children will no longer receive Christmas of Birthday gifts from their deceased parent.  Clary v. State, 140 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940);

b.	A plea for an abandonment of objectivity or for consideration of the expectations of the victim’s family.  Stahl v. State, 749 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).

XIV.
IMPROPER PLEAS FOR A CERTAIN PUNISHMENT
	That the Prosecutor not argue for imposition of the maximum sentence based on comparisons to what other defendants have received for the same or similar crimes, or that anything less than the maximum penalty would be insufficient. Prohibited argument includes, but is not limited to, the following:

a.	That giving the Defendant probation or anything less than the maximum sentence is the same as “excusing” defendant for his actions or “letting him off the hook.” Morris v. State, 755 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd.);

b.	That there is no reason why this Defendant should not be dealt with the same as other defendants who were tried and convicted for the same or a similar crime.  Johnson v. State, 158 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1941).

XV.
GOING OUTSIDE OF THE RECORD
	That the Prosecutor refrain from making any statements during closing argument that go outside of the record to evidence not presented at trial.  Prohibited argument includes, but is not limited to, the following:
a.	To improperly call upon the jury to speculate as to other activities of the accused, not shown by the evidence nor can be inferred from the evidence, and to consider them in reaching a decision.  Walker v. State, 664 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984);

b.	To persuade the jury that the defendant is responsible for more than just the offense alleged in the indictment and to convict him on that basis.  Melton v. State, 713 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986);

c.	Injecting new facts, either directly or by inference, such as implying to the jury that Defendant has been involved in criminal proceedings as a juvenile and emphasizing that the prosecution can only show in evidence final convictions of the accused as an adult.  Parson v. State, 652 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983, no pet.);

d.	That time in prison will be beneficial for the Defendant, such as give him the opportunity to receive a college degree or to continue his education, and will ultimately make him a more productive member of society.  Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973);

e.	Using hypothetical or rhetorical questions to imply that other evidence exists which was not admitted into the record, and inviting the jury to speculate on what that evidence may be.  Berryhill v. State, 501 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); see also Thompson v. State, 89 S.W.3d 843, (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002) (“Ladies and gentlemen, there's something important that I cannot tell you about concerning why you should not give [appellant] anything less than ten years. There's a very important reason but legally I'm not allowed to tell you what it is but it is very important. Trust me on this. If you give [appellant] less than ten years, you will find out later what's going to happen.”);
f.	Argument linked the tragedies of the Columbine school shooting and the Oklahoma bombing with the tragedy of victim’s death is Improper as by its implication it urged jurors to compare D’s acts to the infamous acts of others. State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117 (2002);
g.	References to facts not in evidence or incorrect statements of law. Parks v. State, 843 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref'd); 
h.	Stating that "there are a lot of people who know about these allegations.” Fant-Caughman v. State, 61 S.W.3d 25, 28 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. ref’d).

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, defendant respectfully prays that the Court grant this Motion.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

							[ATTORNEY SIGNATURE BLOCK]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

     As Attorney of Record for Defendant, I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was this date provided to the Attorney for the State on this the _________ day of ___________, 200__.  

                         ____________________________________
                          Attorney for Defendant

		

CAUSE NO.____________

THE STATE OF TEXAS           		*		          IN THE ______________

VS.                          				* 			         COURT IN AND FOR

_____________________        		* 		        _________ COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER

	Defendant's Motion to Limit Jury Argument of State is hereby:

	( )  GRANTED as to paragraphs:_____________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________.

	( )  DENIED as to paragraphs:_______________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________.

	SIGNED on the ____ day of __________________________, 200___.

			
							________________________________
							         JUDGE PRESIDING