NO.

THE STATE OF TEXAS			§            IN THE __________ COURT 
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V.						§	OF
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JOHN DOE					§	________ COUNTY, TEXAS

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

	Defendant, JOHN DOE, submits the following in support of the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence, which was respectfully submitted to this Court on April 15, 2005.

Procedural History
	Defendant allegedly committed the offense which is subject of Cause Number _____ on January 28, 2005.  Defendant was charged by information in Cause Number ______ on February 18, 2005, for the offense of Misdemeanor Driving While Intoxicated with an open container.
Statement of Facts
	On January 28, 2005, the Defendant was stopped by Trooper _________.  The stop was initiated because the _______ County Sheriff’s Department received an anonymous tip that a vehicle was tailgating other vehicles and driving recklessly on U.S. ____ outside of _________, Texas.  The anonymous tipster did not know what county he was in when he called.  Additionally, reports were called into both _________county  and ________ county that the vehicle was driving on the wrong side of the road.  Some of the tips reported that the vehicle was traveling south and some of the tips stated that the Corvette was traveling north.
	Meanwhile, Trooper ___________ had stopped another vehicle when he noticed a defendant’s vehicle driving past.  Officer _________ let the car he had pulled over go and pursued defendant’s vehicle.  When Trooper _________ followed the vehicle, he states that he saw the vehicle driving partially on the shoulder.  Based entirely on anonymous, conflicting, and uncorroborated tips, Trooper __________ pulled the vehicle over.	
Argument

I.  	The evidence of intoxication found by Trooper _________ should be suppressed as a product of an illegal search because there was not sufficient probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant based on anonymous, conflicting tips and there was insufficient corroboration of the tip before the Defendant was detained.

	“An officer may temporarily stop and investigate a vehicle if the officer has reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the detainee is connected to unusual activity with some indication that the activity is related to a crime.”  Stone v. State, 703 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (overruled on other grounds).  The United States Supreme Court said in Alabama v. White, that reasonable suspicion is dependant on both the quality of the information at hand, and its degree of reliability.  496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).  They also said that, “while an anonymous tip or telephone call may, and usually will, justify the initiation of an investigation, it alone will rarely establish the level of suspicion required to justify a detention.”  Id at 329 (emphasis added).  “There must be some further indicia of reliability, some additional facts from which a police officer may reasonably conclude that the tip is reliable and a detention is justified.”  State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref’d). 
	The Amarillo Court of Appeals summarized this idea into three factors significant to the determination of whether a tip provides reasonable suspicion for a temporary detention.  Glenn v. State, 967 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 1998, pet. granted).  The first is the tipster’s ability to accurately predict future behavior of third parties.  Id.  The second is police corroboration of details linking the accused to the stated criminal activity.  Id.  The third and final factor given by the court was “a particularized and objective reason to suspect the accused.”  Id.
	The first Glenn factor, the tipster’s ability to accurately predict future behavior of the third parties, strengthens the Defendant’s case.  The tipsters in the instant case could not predict the future behavior of the Defendant.  First, the original tipster was did not know what county the defendant was in.  It would be a stretch to state that the anonymous tipsters could predict the future behavior of the Defendant if they did not even know where he was.  Secondly, the tipsters were conflicting in their description of the Defendant’s behavior.  Some tips stated that the Defendant was traveling northbound.  Some tips stated that the Defendant was traveling southbound.  Some tipsters stated that the Defendant was traveling on the wrong side of the road, while some tipsters stated that the Defendant was traveling on the correct side of the road.  The anonymous tips conflicted as to what the Defendant was doing, so it would be difficult to say that the tipsters could predict the future behavior of the Defendant.  
	The second Glenn factor, police corroboration of details linking the accused to the stated criminal activity is likewise in the Defendant’s favor.  Trooper _________ states in his report that the Defendant was driving partially on the shoulder.  Trooper _________ did not observe the Defendant driving on the wrong side of the road.  Nor did Trooper _________ observe the Defendant tailgating.  The anonymous, conflicting tips that led to the detention of the Defendant stated that he was driving on the wrong side of the road, or alternatively, that the Defendant was tailgating other vehicles.  Trooper ________ observed the Defendant driving partially on the shoulder and then back onto the road.  The information from the tips was never corroborated prior to Trooper _________’s stop of the Defendant.
	The third Glenn factor, a particularized and objective reason to suspect the accused, also favors the Defendant.  There were many anonymous tips made concerning defendant’s vehicle.  These tips, however, could not possibly have been reliable due to their conflicting nature.  Had the tips all described similar actions, there may have been a particularized and objective reason to detain the Defendant, this however, was not the situation in the instant case.
	In State v. Stolte, a citizen called police on his cell phone to report a suspected DWI.  991 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 1999, no pet.).  The caller gave the police a description of the vehicle, the vehicle’s location, and the vehicle’s license plate number.  Id.  When the responding officer arrived at the described location, he saw the vehicle, turned on his emergency lights and stopped the appellant.  Id.  The informant stayed on the phone with the dispatcher throughout the time the officer was responding, constantly updating her as to the vehicle’s location.  Id at 340.  When the officer pulled the vehicle over, the informant circled the block and pulled in behind the police car.  Id.
	The court reasoned that in light of the totality of circumstances known to the officer at the time of the detention, he was justified in initiating the traffic stop immediately upon verifying the vehicle’s location and description.  Id at 343.  The circumstances discussed by the court were that the officer knew the caller was still on the phone with the dispatcher, that the department’s policy was to have the caller pull in behind the officer after the suspect was stopped, and that the officer verified the vehicle’s description, location, and license plate number.  Id at 342.  The fact that the caller was readily available to give first hand information directly to the officer increased the reliability of the tip, thereby decreasing the amount of police corroboration needed to justify the stop.  Id.  The court reasoned that the totality of those circumstances, combined with the obvious danger that the appellant presented to the public, justified the officer’s stop of the appellant.  Id at 343.
	The instant case is easily distinguished from Stolte. In Stolte, the tipster was available to give the officer information about the activities of the accused to strengthen the reliability of the tip.  In the instant case, the tipsters could not even figure out where the Defendant was, let alone give Trooper __________ firsthand information relating to the exact activities of the Defendant.  Furthermore, none of the tipsters was available to identify the accused at the stop, as was the case in Stolte.  Without extensive information from the tipster during the pursuit of the Defendant, Trooper ___________ needed to further corroborate the tips.
	At best, Trooper _________ had a hunch that the Defendant may be driving while intoxicated.  The inarticulate hunch, suspicion, or good faith of the investigating officer is never sufficient justification for an investigatory detention.  Glass v. State, 681 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 			
Conclusion
	Evidence of the Defendant’s intoxication obtained after his warrantless detention should be suppressed, as the stop which led to the Defendant’s arrest was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause.  The anonymous, conflicting, uncorroborated tips which Trooper __________ relied upon were not enough under the Glenn test to justify the stop.
Respectfully submitted,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

	This is to certify that a copy of Defendant’s Motion and Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence was delivered to the County Attorney of _________ County, Texas on the _____ day of _______, 200__ .

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